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INTRODUCTION
Due to their potential for erupting into large-scale, long-term
violence, international boundary disputes are among the most important
international conflicts to resolve peacefully and legally. But international
law, with its lack of centralized enforcement mechanisms, is plagued
with problems (both theoretical and real) of noncompliance. One way to
increase pressure to respect territorial rights would be to promote the
widespread understanding that in boundary disputes third states are under
an obligation to side with the state whose claim to ownership is legally
more meritorious. Currently, third-party reactions to boundary disputes
are not held to this standard: third states are not expected, even in
principle, to make decisions about which party to support by reference to
the legal merits of the competing positions.'
And so if I could nominate only one change in law to reform the
international legal system's treatment of boundary disputes in the
twenty-first century, it would be the adoption of the following:
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Principle of Third State Responsibility: Conflicts over Territory
Where two or more states both claim the same territory, third states
should support the claimant with the best title, as a matter of
international law.
This would be called "the principle of third state responsibility" for
conflicts over territory, or the "responsibility" principle, for short.
Two other approaches are possible: what I will call the
"adversarial model," which holds that all involved states are free to adopt
whatever position they want, and what I will call the "neutrality model,"
in which states are not supposed to take sides at all. Under these two
models, both of which I reject, the parties bear the whole responsibility
for enforcing their own rights to territory, without any third state
obligation to assist. Neither of these has the capacity of the third state
responsibility model to compensate for the absence of centralized
enforcement of international law.
Pressure is difficult to bring to bear without consensus and
coordination by the international community. Treating third states as free
of obligations to contribute undermines the status of international law
altogether. If third states have no such obligation, international law is
deprived of an important influence for increasing respect for
international law in the community. States can voluntarily attempt to
pressure other states to conform their conduct to international legal
standards, but without norms requiring third states to contribute to the
enforcement effort, there can be little rational expectation of reciprocity.
My object is to call into question three assumptions: first, the
assumption that strong states need consider only their own political or
strategic interests in their dealings with the parties to a dispute; second,
the assumption that alliance with a great power is an adequate reason for
one of two disputants to gain advantage over the other; and third, the
assumption that domestic political expediency is sufficient excuse for a
third state's support of "villains" over "victims."
Third states should act consistently with the merits of the
competing legal positions in their involvement with boundary disputes.
Given the choice between supporting the wronged party with the
meritorious legal claim and supporting the wrongdoer, third states in
territorial disputes should, wherever possible, side with the former and
not the latter. Third states have more serious obligations in this context
than is widely appreciated, and recognizing these obligations in principle
and in practice could greatly contribute to the fair and rational resolution
of international boundary conflicts in the twenty-first century. It is
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precisely because of the lack of centralized government that the
responsibility model is needed.
I. THREE MODELS OF THIRD STATE DECISION MAKING
The question of the proper role third states in territorial disputes
could hardly be timelier. Examples, unfortunately, abound. If Russia (as
the "villain") seizes territory that belongs to Ukraine (as the "victim"), do
third-party observers such as China have any duty to support Ukraine? If
the United States vetoes the U.N. Security Council's proposed
denunciation of Israel's encroachment on West Bank land for building
settlements, is its conduct to be judged by the compatibility of Israeli
action with international legal standards, or are domestic political
expediency and historic alliance reason enough? Similar questions also
arise in other types of cases, such as violations of human rights and
humanitarian law. U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power famously
excoriated Russia and China for blocking US attempts at the Security
Council to strengthen measures against Assad's Syria.' Did Russia or
China do anything unlawful, or were they simply exercising their
legitimate prerogatives as political actors?
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
The model adopted here holds that third states should act
consistently with the merits of the competing legal positions in their
involvement with other states' boundary disputes. This model will be
called the "third state responsibility" model, or the responsibility model
for short. The basic underlying principle (the responsibility principle) is
that the states composing the international community ought to make
decisions in the manner most likely to result in an outcome that respects
the legal rights of the parties, and that this is most likely to happen when
the involved third states support the disputant with the better legal claim.
2 See Cam Anna, US Ambassador: Russian Veto 'Extremely Disruptive' on Syria, YAHOO! NEWS,
Mar. 20, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/us-ambassador-russian-veto-extremely-disruptive-syria-
224029921.html (reporting on Ambassador Power's criticism of Russia and China's joint veto
against a proposal for Security Council action in Syria); ]an Black, Russia and China Veto UN
Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN, May 22, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-
syria-international-criminal-court (reporting on Ambassador Power's criticism of Russia and
China for their joint veto against a Security-Council backed resolution to refer the Syrian crisis
to the International Criminal Court).
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It is certainly the case that accurate boundaries can be difficult or
impossible to determine, even for objective neutral experts with
substantial resources (let alone for busy foreign ministry lawyers with
little expertise or interest in the subject, many of whom are likely to be
highly partisan). This is particularly so in territorial disputes, many of
which depend on disputed historical occurrences provable only through
obscure documents found in hard-to-access national archives. The
problem is especially difficult, of course, when the parties have reason to
withhold evidence for strategic reasons, or where important historical
materials were lost or destroyed. But even in that small fraction of cases
where the parties present their best evidence publicly (for example, in
written pleadings before the International Court of Justice) it may be
impossible for third states to determine which side is meritorious.
Where the merits are simply impossible to determine, however,
third states have several options. One is to pressure the parties to submit
their claim to adjudication (for example, by an international court or
arbitral tribunal). This strategy has the effect of supporting the state with
the better legal case. Another is to remain neutral because the disputants
seem to have equally good legal arguments. Said in good faith (and not
as an excuse where the evidence is clear but inconsistent with the result
that the third state wants) this is a perfectly logical position to take. What
would be inappropriate would be for a third state to say that it was
impossible to know which side had the better legal claim, but then
support one of the parties on some ground other than merit.
Determining which side has the better argument may be difficult
for third states, but it is not always easy for the parties themselves, either.
Nevertheless, we expect them to make this determination: difficulty in
determination does not constitute an excuse for the party who violated
international law. We impose strict liability, in effect, on the actor that
violated international law, and we can do the same with third parties who
are prone to error for closely analogous reasons. In any event, the
difficulty of determining the merits of a territorial dispute in some cases
does not require allowing third states to support the wrong side in those
cases where the merits are clear. It is in cases where the merits are clear
that the principle of third-states intervention is most important, because
those are the cases in which the violation of international law is most
egregious.
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To date, international law has not adopted the responsibility
model, either for boundary disputes or for disputes in general.3 Even
states that claim to respect international law do not necessarily feel
legally bound to consult international law before deciding which other
states to support. States that take sides in territorial disputes apparently
consider themselves free to choose which territorial claims to support on
the basis of any consideration whatsoever: shared history, ethnic
prejudice, an enticing promise of bilateral aid, anticipation of
commercial benefit, common language or religion, crass political
advantage, or animus towards the other party to the dispute.
Some of the factors that states take into account are more
appealing than "crass political advantage" or ethnic prejudice. For
example, a state might choose to support meritless territorial claims
because the claimant has a better human rights record than it opponent
does, or because the claimant's president is facing a difficult electoral
challenge from an unsavory neo-fascist demagogue. While such
considerations can be appealing, the responsibility model would require
them to take a back seat o the merits of the territorial dispute.
B. THE ADVERSARIAL AND NEUTRALITY MODELS
Here, we might consider an analogy to the "adversarial model"
of the US legal system, in which partisanship is lauded as the method
most likely to produce a sound and lawful result. The adversarial model
of US litigation ethics gives the participants almost complete freedom to
take whatever positions they find to their advantage.4 The guiding
As Louis Henkin wrote in his classic treatment How NATIONS BEHAVE:
For most international norms or obligations there is no judgment or reaction by the
community to deter violation. The ordinary violation of law or treaty is not yet a
"crime" against the society to be vindicated by the society. It is unusual for nations
not directly involved to respond to a violation even of a widely accepted norm. .. [J
LOUIS HENKN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 58 (Columbia Univ. Press, 2d ed., 1979).
See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975) ("Let
justice be done-that is, for my client let justice be done-though the heavens fall."); Robert J.
Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 172, 173 (David Luban ed., 1983) ("Our legal system is not
cooperative but ... adversarial. The basic premise ... is that open and relatively unrestrained
competition among individuals produces the maximum collective good."); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATIONS 123, 129 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2003) ("[In] America's
current adversary system... winning has become such a preeminent goal that it has obscured
other values.").
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principle, I submit, is that intense partisanship on both sides is the best
way to generate the wide variety of factual and legal arguments needed
to produce the best-informed conclusions. Within few limits, therefore,
each side is supposed to present its own arguments in the strongest
possible form, without any responsibility to provide any facts and law
contradicting its claim. The parties and their lawyers are not expected to
assume direct responsibility for a correct decision: they each do their part
through a one-sided presentation designed entirely with the object of
winning.
Of course, states do not always take sides. A second alternative
to the responsibility model might be called the neutrality model. The
neutrality model, as I envision it, holds that third states should not
support one side over the other. Neutrality allows for an honest broker
who, with the trust of both states, is in a better position to mediate and
reach peaceful compromise solution. It is possible that more can be
achieved towards the peaceful resolution of disputes if third states remain
neutral: neutrality increases credibility and an honest broker may be
more effective than a partisan at inducing the parties to accept
compromise.
What differentiates the responsibility model from both the
adversarial and neutrality models is that both of the two alternatives treat
whether the state's chosen course of action respects international law as
immaterial. When deciding upon a position, third states are not expected
to factor into the equation how best to promote the legal outcome: either
they treat both disputants equally (under the neutrality model), or they
make self-interested arguments and then the chips fall where they may
(the adversarial model).
Both the adversarial and the neutrality models work well enough
when there is a centralized decision maker that can render authoritative
judgments. In the domestic context, they operate in conjunction with a
neutral judge or jury that is expected to sort out the parties' presentations
to reach (as nearly as possible) the truth. The evidence and arguments are
expected to be partisan, but the decision making process is not. But
transposing either of these two models onto the international context
removes these models' advantages. First, consider the adversarial model:
absent an authoritative decision maker, when all states are entitled to
support any position that they please there is simply no reason to think
that the outcome will reflect anything other than the distribution of
power, wealth, and diplomatic skill.
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The neutrality model does not fare much better. Domestically, a
centralized decision maker has responsibility for ensuring conformity
with the law and the facts; as was the case for the adversarial model,
however, no such decision maker exists in the international context. If
the merits of the disputants' position are very closely balanced, so that it
is impossible to predict which has the better case, then a posture of
neutrality might be appropriate.' But not every case has equally good
arguments on both sides. For the community to remain completely
neutral in all cases, closely balanced or not, there is an air of false
equivalence. This may make compromise more reachable, but
compromise is not always desirable. In a case where the merits clearly
point in one direction, compromise is the wrong solution: it only
encourages the violator state to engage in further violations.
It is precisely because the international community lacks
centralized enforcement capacity that the responsibility model is
important. Whereas the responsibility model tilts the playing field in
favor of the correct legal answer, the two alternative models leave the
victim without any reliable source of support. The responsibility model
moves in exactly the opposite direction. The responsibility model
recognizes the role that third states play in supporting international law,
in a context where law is at its most precarious. It is perhaps one of the
best potential antidotes that we have to the cynicism of international
power politics.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: REALISM VERSUS LEGALISM
The responsibility model is best situated to meet the foundational
challenges raised by the realist school of thought. Because there is no
centralized enforcement mechanism with the power to make and enforce
decisions, it falls to the rest of the international community to take up the
slack and to bear the associated costs. There is simply no other state or
body of states available to do the job. Whether the international system
qualifies to be called "law" boils down in large part to the kind and
degree of influence exercised by third states.
Much of the theoretical literature about the foundations of
international law assumes that third states will support the result
' See supra Part l.A.
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compelled by international law.6 This is not wholly implausible, because
in most cases, one state's treaty partners benefit from its behavior
according to treaty and customary international law. But it enjoys a
healthy measure of wishful thinking. Third states will not always find it
in their interest to assume the costs of enforcement of international law.
The result is that whether international law counts as law depends on the
extent to which third states assume a role that can be costly. The
alternative models make assistance to the victim state optional or even
impermissible; the responsibility model makes it mandatory.
A. THE REALISM/LEGALISM DEBATE
The theoretical importance of an expectation that third states will
take on a role as enforcer of international law stems from the role that
third states potentially play in the argument over whether international
norms are really law. Probably the most hotly debated theoretical issue in
contemporary international law concerns whether the concept of law has
any meaning in a decentralized system. Realists take the position that
international norms cannot be characterized as "law" because the word
"law" applies only to commands backed by force According to the
realists, (also variously referred to also as neo-realists, neo-conservatives
or neo-cons) only if the punishment is sufficiently strong and certain to
punish past violations and deter future ones can the system can be
characterized as a legal system.
According to this argument, no norms deserve that label in the
decentralized world of international relations. Realists argue that with no
centralized enforcement mechanism, adequate pressure to compel
conformity to international law is lacking. Therefore, they downplay the
importance of international norms and typically deny the existence of
6 For a particularly well developed account of international law that deals with the role of third
states in enforcement, see generally Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting:
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011); see also Harold
Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,205
(1996).
7 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law (John
M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 63, 1998) [hereinafter A Theory of Customary
International Law]; see generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. Adams, Adjudicating in Anarchy:
An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229,
1234-1235, 1252 (2004).
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international legality altogether.8 Regularities in international behavior
are typically explained as manifestations of self-interested power
seeking, which can be studied from an empirical but not a moral or legal
viewpoint. In particular, realists deny that there is anything meeting the
necessary conditions to be called "international law," on the grounds that
(to be worthy of the name) international law would have to be supported
by some centralized enforcement mechanism-a criterion that is not
now, and in the future may never be, satisfied.
The opponents of realism (referred to as legalists, rationalists, or
idealists) disagree with the empirical claim that there is no international
enforcement mechanism adequate to compel obedience to international
norms.9 According to this legalist model, the domestic system of
centralized enforcement of legal norms is not the only model of genuine
law: international enforcement simply takes different shapes than
domestic enforcement."0 One way to dispute the realist claim has been to
identify as many hitherto unappreciated forms of enforcement pressure
as possible.' ' Every factor that contributes to rewarding lawful state
conduct or that discourages unlawful state conduct must be included in
the calculation. To overlook some factors that increase compliance with
norms is to underestimate the orderliness of international relations, and
to credit unnecessarily the realist argument that enforcement capacity is
lacking.
For present purposes, therefore, the essential question is how
much additional enforcement is contributed by including third parties'
efforts (pressure, shaming, economic sanctions, and so forth). If third
8 A Theory of Customary International Law, supra note 7, at 3.
This school of thought includes approaches such as conventional international law, international
moral philosophy, and natural law. This is the tradition that gave rise to contemporary human
rights and humanitarian law; although often called by other names (e.g., idealistic or rationalist)
we will use the label "legalistic."
'0 See, e.g., Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 6 (describing "outcasting" - the new way to
understand domestic and international law enforcement).
Harold Koh describes the school of thought:
Under this rationalistic account, pitched at the level of the international system,
nations employ cooperative strategies to pursue a complex, multifaceted long-run
national interest, in which compliance with negotiated legal norms serves as a
winning long-term strategy in a reiterated "prisoner's dilemma" game.
Harold Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1402 (1999)
[hereinafter How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?] ("After participating in game-
theoretic discussions, to avoid multi-party prisoners' dilemma, nations may decide to cooperate
around certain rules, which lead them to establish what international relations theorists call
'regimes."'). See also Harold Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2632 (1997) [hereinafter Why do Nations Obey International Law?].
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parties are relatively influential in pressuring other states to comply, the
case for the existence of international law is strengthened. If third parties
have little to contribute, however, the realist critique of international law
gains momentum and threatens to derail the foundational argument for
the existence of the international legal system altogether.
B. FREE RIDERS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
Faced with the lack of governance that characterizes domestic
legal systems, legal theorists have, in recent decades, embraced game
theory and rational choice theory enthusiastically in order to identify and
analyze the mechanisms that do, they claim, exist.'2 The academic
literature explaining international law and relations in terms of game
theory is vast, and two-by-two matrices litter the law reviews. Of
particular interest has been the concept of reciprocity, which generated a
wave of enthusiasm about Prisoners' Dilemma, Tit for Tat, and similar
games and strategies.'
3
It is not difficult to understand the academics' enthusiasm.4 The
concept of reciprocity seems tailor-made to explain why (as Louis
Henkin put it) "most" states feel compelled "most of the time"'5 to
observe "most" international treaties and international customary law
even in the absence of world government, world courts with compulsory
jurisdiction, and a world police force. Harold Koh describes what he
calls the "rationalist instrumentalist" line of reasoning, which "views
international rules as instruments whereby states seek to attain their
interests in wealth, power, and the like."' 6
12 See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 93, 94 (2003); see generally George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The
Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 544-545 (2005); Jens David Ohlin,
Nash Equilibrium and International Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 869 (2011); John K. Setear, Law
in the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by
Using the International Treaty Process to Define "Iteration ", 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 641 (1997).
13 The enthusiasm for game theory models is evinced by, for example, Professor Axelrod's
comment that "[t]he two-person iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is the E. Coli of the social
sciences." See ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION, at xi (1997).
4 Casting international law as a "game" played for selfish interests gets rid of the need to discuss
the moral imperative for obeying international law-namely, that states must obey international
law because it is law or because it is the right thing to do.
'5 Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 15 (1968).
16 Why do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 11, at 2632; see also How is International
Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 11, at 1402 ("After participating in game-theoretic
discussions, to avoid multi-party prisoners' dilemma, nations may decide to cooperate around
certain rules, which lead them to establish what international relations theorists call 'regimes."').
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International relations scholars such as Robert Keohane, Duncan
Snidal, and Oran Young, and legal scholars such as Kenneth Abbott
and John Setear, have applied increasingly sophisticated techniques
of rational choice theory to argue that nation-states obey international
law when it serves their short or long term self-interest to do so.
Under this rationalistic account, pitched at the level of the
international system, nations employ cooperative strategies to pursue
a complex, multifaceted long-run national interest, in which
compliance with negotiated legal norms serves as a winning long-
term strategy in a reiterated "prisoner's dilemma" game.17
The favored strategy is to link your choice of move to the move that your
opponent made in a previous round of the game: tit for tat. That way,
your opponent's best strategy will be to cooperate and both of you will
benefit.
There are reasons to believe that the value of such analysis has
been overrated;s but that is not our problem now. Suffice it to say that
whatever the problems are with using reciprocity to model the decision
making of the individual victim and individual villain, they are far less
serious than the problems with trying to devise a strategy for dealing
with third states. Third states have lower incentives (generally speaking)
to take action in response to violations and there are many more of them.
Bringing the collective authority of the entire international community to
bear is a more difficult problem than engaging the energies of the
immediate parties.
This is so for several interrelated reasons. First, the individual
claimants have more at stake in the full enforcement of legal norms than
the third states: they have a stake in the dispute that is more concrete and
direct than any interests of the community at large. The claimants in a
territorial dispute are fighting first and foremost for the land. The third
states have a genuine but diffuse interest in the lawfulness of the
community, and in the ability to rely on the enforceability of customary
and treaty based international law. But the claimants have this diffuse
interest as well as their immediate claims to the territory. Thus, whatever
the stake of the third states, it is less than the claimants', because third
states have general interest in the lawfulness of the community while the
17 Why do Nations Obey International Law?, supra note 11, at 2632; see also How Is International
Human Rights Law Enforced?, at 1402 ("After participating in game-theoretic discussions, to
avoid multi-party prisoners' dilemma, nations may decide to cooperate around certain rules,
which lead them to establish what international relations theorists call 'regimes."').
18 See generally, Lea Brilmayer & Yunsieg Kim, Modeling or Muddling? The Unholy Alliance of
Law, Economics, and International Relations (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with
authors).
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individual claimants have not only that but also their distinctive
individual claims.
Second, states often conclude that they can reap the benefits of a
strong state's efforts at enforcing legal norms without paying the
associated costs.9 Taking action against the multitudinous villains of the
international community can be an expensive proposition. Military action
has obvious costs, economic sanctions are costly in terms of foregone
trade opportunities, and often it is necessary to invest considerable
resources in the project of convincing other states to maintain
embargoes. Taking action against a co-religionist can make a
government unpopular domestically. The value that an individual state
may get out of assuming its share of the enforcement cost may be less
than the cost of taking action. Let "the world's policemen" do the dirty
work, spending time and resources organizing political coalitions and
holding them together.
The calculations made by third states of the costs and benefits of
enforcing the law are most likely done to systematically underestimate
the benefits of enforcement. The state that voluntarily takes on the
burden of enforcement does not capture the entire benefit itself. The
community as a whole may benefit greatly from the increase in
lawfulness, but most of this benefit goes to other states.
This is of course the familiar collective action problem of free
riders. It is endemic to large group situations in which the benefit of
some course of action can be obtained regardless of whether you make
your contribution-that is to say, the benefits are non-excludable.2" If the
benefit is non-excludable, this costs them nothing in terms of the hoped-
for advantages of action. If every state does the calculations, all may
come to the conclusion that it is better to free ride and allow other states
to bear the cost of action. The result may be that no one acts and the
benefits are lost.
There are indeed some situations in which the collective action
problem can be resolved, and such analyses can be practically valuable
'9 Nathalie Colombier et al., Global Security Policies against Terrorism and the Free Riding
Problem: An Experimental Approach, 13 J. OF PUB. ECON. THEORY 755, 755-56 (2011)
("collective actions against terrorism may suffer from the well known free riding problem...
global security policies may be perceived as an international Global Public Good...
characterized by an incentive for countries to defect by investing in alternative projects ... while
profiting from the protection policy implemented by others .... ").
20 See Katharina Holzinger, Treaty Formation and Strategic Constellations, A Comment on
Treaties: Strategic Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 195 ("the property of
nonexcludability allows for free riding.").
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and theoretically important. But it cannot be enough simply to say that
individual third states have the capacity to help to pressure the violator,
or that if they did cooperate to pressure the violator this effort would
have the desired effect of deterring future violators. Treating the problem
as some international legal theorists do-as solved because game
theorists have shown how certain configurations of pay offs sometimes
can provide a way for inducing cooperation-is simply wishful thinking.
There may be circumstances in which the community does marshal the
resources of enough of the individual third states to compel the violator
to relinquish its ill-gotten territorial gains. Because of the costs of
enforcement, however, and because of the problem of free riding, it is
easy to see that this will not always happen. When the existence of
international law is challenged, it is not enough to wave the game theory
flag and cite the few examples where third states, NGOs, or the United
Nations came to the rescue.
The problem with the usual discussions of general interests of
third states is that they do not always sufficiently take into account the
fact that for some or all of the third states the cost may outweigh the
benefit, or that it might be possible to free ride on the enforcement
activities of the other states. Left to their own devices, there will surely
be some third states that choose to shirk. What is needed is a way to
make third state assistance mandatory, not optional. Notice that when the
United Nations Security Council is serious about imposing sanctions on a
country that has violated some important international legal norm, it
makes that norm mandatory.
It is extraordinarily difficult to imagine how this can be done
without something akin to the responsibility principle. Neither the
adversarial model nor the neutrality model moves things forward. The
responsibility principle holds that third states have an obligation to
support the disputant who is in the right. That by itself is certainly not
sufficient, but it is, in my opinion, certainly necessary. Adopting this
principle as a requirement would be a good first move toward truly
marshaling the efforts of the community at large in order to promote the
resolution that is based on international law.
III. CONCLUSION
Lacking a principle that third states' positions should reflect the
legal merits, international law fails to harness all possible sources of
support for peaceful resolution of international boundary disputes. A
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model that makes support of international law by third states completely
voluntary risks losing its claim to recognition as law altogether.
The first step towards a fully functioning system of third state
enforcement would be to treat as mandatory the expectation that third
states assert whatever influence they have in favor of the result
compelled by international law. Over time, this would shift the relevant
discourse to the important question of which state has the better case to
the territory. Public discourse would focus on historical events and their
legal consequences, in particular those that relate to the overall pattern of
discovery, effective occupation, treaties, decolonization, and contiguity
of territory.2
The parties themselves would be part of this discourse, both as
speakers and as listeners; one hopes that over time the increasing reliance
on international law of territorial acquisition would lead to
internalization of the relevant legal standards. A state that was clearly in
the wrong would be less able to continue on in the illusion that other
states all probably agreed with it. A state that was in the right would be
encouraged to stand up for its claim. The immediate benefit of the
proposal is that the attempt to put it into practice would require an
important shift in focus away from simple questions of strategic interest
to questions about the merits of the controversy.
2 1 For a general discussion of these methods of acquiring territory, see generally SIR ROBERT Y.
JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963).
